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China’s changing economy: implications for its carbon 
dioxide emissions  
Fergus Green and Nicholas Stern 
Abstract  
As China’s government finalises the country’s 13th Five Year Plan for economic 
development (2016–2020), this article takes stock of recent changes in China’s economy and 
energy system since the turn of the century, and looks ahead to the likely trajectory of 
China’s emissions over the next decade. The period 2000–2013, it is now clear, was a distinct 
and exceptional phase in China’s developmental history, during which the very high levels of 
greenhouse gases emitted were linked closely with the energy-intensive, heavy industry-
based growth model pursued at that time. China is currently undergoing another major 
structural transformation — towards a new development model focused on achieving better 
quality growth that is more sustainable and inclusive — and it is also grappling with 
economic challenges associated with the transition. Data from 2014 and the first three 
quarters of 2015 illustrate the extent of these changes. Based on analysis of this data in light 
of the underlying changes occurring in China’s economy and policy, this article provides an 
updated forecast of the Kaya components of energy CO2 emissions (GDP, energy/GDP and 
CO2/energy) over the next decade to 2025. It concludes that China’s CO2 emissions from 
energy, if they grow at all, are likely to grow much slower than under the old economic 
model and are likely to peak at some point in the decade before 2025. 
Policy Relevance Statement 
The article suggests a number of important areas of Chinese policy focus to mitigate risks and 
challenges that might otherwise prolong the peak date for CO2 emissions. Our analysis and 
conclusions also have more general implications for Chinese and international climate policy. 
They suggest that China’s international commitment to peak emissions ‘around 2030’ should 
be seen as a highly conservative upper limit from a government that prefers to under-promise 
and over-deliver. They also reinforce the virtue of a ‘dynamic’ approach to international 
climate cooperation, as envisaged under the Paris Agreement, whereby countries’ targets and 
policies are regularly updated in light of new information. The importance of macroeconomic 
analysis for emissions projections climate policy development is also highlighted.  
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1. Introduction 
As China’s government finalises the country’s 13th Five Year Plan for economic development 
(2016–2020), and in the wake of the successful negotiation of the Paris Agreement in 
December 2015, this article takes stock of recent changes in China’s economy and energy 
system. It places these recent changes in the context of wider shifts in China’s economic 
development pattern since the turn of the century, and looks ahead to the likely trajectory of 
China’s emissions over the next decade. 
The article primarily contributes to an ongoing debate about the likely trajectory and peaking 
year of China’s emissions. The Chinese government has committed China internationally to 
‘achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions around 2030’ and to make ‘best efforts to 
peak early’ (People’s Republic of China, 2015). Some analysts of China’s economy and 
energy sector have argued that China’s emissions are likely to peak by or before 2030 
(Garnaut, 2014; Global Commission on the Economy and Climate [GCEC], 2014; Green and 
Stern, 2015; He, 2014; Jiang, Zhuang, Miao, & He, 2013; Teng & Jotzo, 2014). These 
predictions are at odds with the vast majority of energy system and economic (general 
equilibrium) modelling studies of China, which find that peaking by 2030 will be challenging 
without profound changes in climate-energy policy (see the analysis of 89 modelling 
scenarios by Grubb et al., 2015).  
In an important recent contribution that provides a convenient point of departure for the 
present article, Grubb et al. (2015) illuminated the structural features of twelve of the main 
models used to forecast Chinese emissions to 2030 using statistical analysis of the Kaya 
components of these models. They found that the carbon intensity of energy is the major 
dependent variable affecting CO2 emissions, implying that ‘most CO2 reductions from the 
models are delivered by interfuel substitution and adoption of technologies with lower CO2 
intensity’, especially in the electricity sector (at S22). The vast majority of the models 
reviewed ‘pay relatively little (or no) attention to macroeconomic structure’ and its potential 
to change (at S31). Rather, the models tend to assume smooth continuations in economic 
growth rate, economic structure and energy demand based on historical trends. Accordingly, 
the models would do a poor job of predicting future emissions in the context of significant 
and rapid structural economic changes, particularly were these to affect energy demand. 
The present article argues that China is in fact undergoing large-scale, rapid, and 
multidimensional changes in economic structure, with major implications for energy demand, 
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at the same time as the energy supply is diversifying. Accordingly, the modelling scenarios 
referred to above, insofar as they fail to account for such changes, will not generate accurate 
forecasts of China’s emissions trajectory. Moreover, it may be very difficult to capture the 
changes occurring in China with yet further formal modelling exercises (Grubb et al., 2015).  
This article therefore takes a different approach to analyse China’s emissions trajectory. 
Methodologically, we proceed by explaining the genesis and nature of the recent and ongoing 
changes in China’s economy, economic strategy/policy, and energy sector (Part 2). In the 
light of this overview, we then synthesise relevant data from the period January 2014 to 
September 2015 to produce an account of what might be termed the early or transitional 
phase of China’s ‘new normal’ economic strategy (Part 3). In Part 4 we explore how the 
dynamics of this new strategy are likely to play out over the next decade, while also 
identifying risks, challenges and key policy responses to these. We use a simple illustrative 
scenario to show how the likely trends we identify in this Part could lead to a peak in CO2 
emissions before 2025. We conclude by considering some implications of our analysis for 
both policy and future research.  
2.  2000–2013: heavy industry growth and its implications 
China has been growing very rapidly, often at double-digit rates, for more than three decades 
since its period of reform and opening-up took hold in the late 1970s / early 1980s. Its 
strategy has been centred on high savings and investment, strong export orientation and a 
focus on manufacturing and construction industries. Yet periods of continuity have been 
punctuated by major structural shifts. 
One such shift came at the turn of the century, as China rapidly developed its energy-
intensive, heavy industries. Over the period of roughly 2000–2013, China’s growth strategy 
was characterised by the following features (China Council for International Cooperation on 
Environment and Development [CCICED], 2014; Garnaut et al., 2013; 2014):   
 roughly double-digit annual GDP growth (on average); 
 a very high investment share of expenditure, with exceptionally low proportions of 
expenditure on domestic consumption and services; 
 very high levels of investment in heavy industry sectors such as steel and cement 
production, which require large volumes of energy (both direct fossil fuel inputs in the 
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production process and electricity consumption, with the latter supplied 
predominantly through expansions in coal-fired power generation); 
 a high profit share of income; 
 strong dependence on exports to external markets, albeit less so in the period 
following the global financial crisis of 2007/08, in which falls in net-exports were 
largely replaced by additional, government-stimulated domestic investment.  
One consequence of this growth model was an extraordinary expansion in coal consumption. 
Between 2000 and 2013, China’s coal consumption nearly trebled, growing at a compound 
rate of more than 8% per year (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS], 2015a
1
). This rapid 
growth saw China become a net importer of coal from 2009, and by the end of this period 
half of the coal consumed globally was being consumed in China.  
This model brought with it many benefits. However, the Chinese people (Pew Research 
Centre, 2013; Wike & Parker, 2015), leading experts (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 
2015; World Bank & DRC, 2013) and China’s leaders2 have increasingly come to recognise 
that this model of growth is not sustainable or desirable — for economic, financial, social and 
local environmental reasons, to say nothing of its incompatibility with global climate goals 
(Stern, 2015, pp. 224–225). 
First, China’s growth model is environmentally unsustainable. In particular, the economy’s 
reliance on coal-fired power and heavy industrial production, and its growing vehicle use in 
urban areas, have led to acute rises in outdoor air pollution, to which China’s growing urban 
population is exposed (CCICED, 2014; World Bank & DRC, 2014). Air pollution is exacting 
an immense toll on public health: in the most comprehensive study of ground monitoring data 
to date, particulate matter pollution measuring less than 2.5 micrometres in diameter (PM2.5) 
in China has been estimated to contribute to 1.6 million premature deaths per year, i.e. 4,000 
deaths per day (Rohde & Muller, 2015) — or a monetary equivalent (using conventional 
monetisation techniques) of more than 10% of China’s GDP (Hamilton, forthcoming). Other 
environmental impacts are mounting, too, including water pollution and water scarcity, soil 
pollution and solid waste (CCICED, 2014; World Bank & DRC, 2014).  
                                                 
1
 This data takes into account the significant statistical revision of Chinese coal data from 2000–2013 following 
the five-yearly economic census completed in 2014.  
2
 See, e.g., remarks made by President Xi (quoted in Anonymous, 2013) and Premier Li (quoted in Anderlini, 
Mitchell and Wildau, 2015).  
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The old model of growth, while lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, has 
also produced various undesirable social impacts that are adding to pressures for reform (Hu, 
2015; World Bank & DRC, 2014; Pew Research Centre, 2013; Wike & Parker, 2015). Most 
prominently, it has led to growing inequalities of different kinds. Rapid urbanisation and 
urban economic growth, combined with China’s restrictive residential registration (hukou) 
system, have led to rising urban-rural inequality and social divisions between registered and 
unregistered urban residents (World Bank & DRC, 2014). There has also been growing 
inequality between regions as the growth was disproportionately concentrated in the eastern 
coastal cities, though with an increasing shift toward central regions in recent years (Hu, 
2015). In addition, the low-wage/high-profit structure of the old growth model combined with 
the relatively low expenditure on social services contributed to rising interpersonal inequality 
(Garnaut et al., 2013). Meanwhile, the health impacts of pollution and environmental 
degradation have created deep and growing social pressures for change (Pew Research 
Centre, 2013; Sheehan, Cheng, English, & Sun, 2014; Wike & Parker, 2015).  
Thirdly, the old model of growth is unsustainable in a conventional economic sense. As 
demand in many parts of China’s construction and heavy industrial sectors passes saturation 
points, continued political-economic incentives to invest in these areas have resulted in 
widespread excess capacity and diminishing returns on capital, undermining their 
competitiveness and resulting in weak productivity growth (CCICED, 2014; IMF, 2015). 
Additionally, the working-age proportion of China’s population (i.e. those between 16 and 60 
years old) is shrinking (Fan, 2015), contributing to upward pressure on wages. Changing 
labour market conditions are, in turn, eroding China’s comparative advantage in low-wage, 
low-value-added, export-oriented manufacturing (IMF, 2015). Moreover, natural resource 
constraints, environmental deterioration and high levels of dependence on imported energy 
are also undermining China’s economic performance and imposing mounting economic costs 
(CCICED, 2014; GCEC 2014; World Bank & DRC, 2014).  
Additionally, China faces major vulnerabilities in its financial sector that threaten long-term 
growth if not managed well. In the midst of the global financial crisis of 2007–08, state-
owned banks engaged in a major expansion of credit that resulted in large amounts of bank 
debt being accumulated by local governments and commercial enterprises to finance 
investment, especially in property construction and infrastructure, in turn stimulating demand 
for heavy-industrial products like steel and cement (Guan et al., 2014, p. 1019). Total debt in 
the Chinese economy quadrupled from an estimated $7 trillion in 2007 to $28 trillion by mid-
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2014 (Dobbs, Lund, Woetzel, & Mutafchieva, 2015). Given the extent of excess capacity in 
real estate and heavy industry, much of the investment was not allocated to profitable 
projects, leaving Chinese banks with large and rising portfolios of non-performing loans 
(IMF, 2015). Deeper problems with credit quality are being revealed as the economy slows 
(see, e.g., Bland, 2015). According to the IMF, these vulnerabilities ‘have reached the point 
that addressing them is an urgent priority’ (IMF, 2015, p. 8). 
Around 2012–13, China’s then-incoming generation of political leaders began articulating the 
need for fundamental structural change and policy reform — a ‘new normal’ — in order to 
respond to these challenges and steer China’s development path onto a more sustainable and 
desirable course. Between late 2013 and 2015, the contours of that agenda have been 
articulated with increasing force and clarity at the highest levels of China’s government 
(Central Committee of the Communist Party of China [CCCPC], 2013; State Council, 2013; 
Zhang, 2014; and see Kuijs, 2015).  
This ‘new normal’ is understood by China’s leadership and policy elite as embodying a shift 
toward economic growth of a higher quality and lower rate, with a particular emphasis on 
four sub-themes: services, innovation, reduced inequality and environmental sustainability.
3
 
‘Services’ and ‘innovation’ can be read as proxies for the changing structure of Chinese 
industry and investment towards services and higher-value-added manufacturing. ‘Reduced 
inequality’ refers to rebalancing the economy toward domestic consumption and initiatives to 
reduce urban-rural and inter-regional inequalities. Environmental sustainability is both a 
product of the other measures and a distinct aim referring to changes in the energy supply and 
other environmental and climate policy initiatives. For example, a number of additional 
energy/climate plans and policies were introduced around 2013, including the National 
Climate Change Plan, the Energy Development Strategic Action Plan, and the Air Pollution 
Prevention and Control Plan. One can readily see how each of these sub-themes directly 
responds to the social, environmental and economic legacy of the old model of growth, 
discussed above. 
Through a combination of emergent changes in the economy and top-down shifts in strategy 
and policy, deep and wide-ranging changes in China’s economic structure and policy are now 
                                                 
3
 This summary definition of the ‘new normal’ concept is based on Stern’s discussions with Chinese leaders and 
policymakers at the China Development Forum in March 2015. These four sub-themes are also apparent from 
key documents produced under China’s new leadership over the last two years, such as those cited in the 
previous paragraph (cf Hu, 2015).  
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occurring — changes ‘so comprehensive and profound that they add up to a new model of 
Chinese economic growth’ (Garnaut et al., 2013; cf Hu, 2015). At the same time, China is 
experiencing shorter-term transitional challenges associated with the decline of industries that 
powered the old growth model and the introduction of policies needed to underpin the new 
model. The following section substantiates this picture of profound change by analysing 
recent economic data and associated dynamics.  
3. 2014–2015: the early phase of China’s ‘new normal’ 
The nature, scale and pace of change occurring in China can be gleaned by recent analysis of 
data relating to energy consumption and energy supply, and their underlying dynamics, and 
contrasting these with trends from the previous growth phase. 
3.1 Energy consumption 
Driven by strong growth in heavy industry investment and production, China’s total primary 
energy consumption (PEC) grew at a compound annual rate of more than 8% per year 
between 2000–2013 (NBS, 2015a). In a dramatic shift, PEC growth slowed to just over one 
quarter of this level in 2014, growing only 2.2% compared with 2013 (NBS, 2015b), and 
slowed even further to less than 1% year-on-year in the first three quarters of 2015 (NBS, 
2015c).  
To understand why this shift has occurred, it is helpful to analyse energy consumption as the 
product of GDP and the energy intensity of GDP (the latter reflecting both changes in the 
sectoral composition of growth and changes in energy efficiency within sectors).  
GDP growth in China has fallen from an average of 10.5% p.a. over the period 2000–2010, to 
7–8% over 2012–2014 (World Bank, 2015; IMF, 2015). Official data record growth slowing 
to below 6.9% over the first three quarters of 2015 (NBS, 2015c), with unofficial forecasts 
using alternative methods forecasting significantly lower levels of growth for 2015.
4
  
China’s slowing growth rate is linked to the changing structure of its economy, which is 
moving away from high reliance on net exports, fixed asset investment and heavy industry, 
and towards greater domestic consumption and tertiary production (IMF, 2015; NBS, 2015c).  
                                                 
4
 See, for example, the average of forecasts by experts using alternative methods produced by Consensus 
Economics (cited in Wolf, 2015). 
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Of particular importance in this structural change is the declining share of industry in GDP. 
Heavy industry expanded rapidly in the 2000–2013 period, with the result that China’s 
industry share of GDP — accounting for 44% in 2013 — has been exceptionally high 
compared with countries at similar levels of development (Grubb et al., 2015; Xu, Zhao, Liu 
& Kang, 2014). Because Chinese industry is such a high consumer of energy relative to the 
services, household and transport sectors, the changes in the structure of growth described 
above are putting strong downward pressure on PEC growth. Notably, the steel and cement 
industries, which are especially high energy users, have begun to decline. In 2014, these 
industries grew much slower than in the 2000–2013 period (NBS, 2015b), and in the first half 
of 2015 they declined in absolute terms: crude steel production fell by 1.3%, and cement 
production fell by 5.3%, compared with the same period in 2014 (NBS, 2015d).  
These structural changes are occurring on top of ongoing energy conservation initiatives 
within industry and other sectors (see Song et al., 2015). The result of both structural change 
and energy efficiency improvements has been especially strong declines in the energy 
intensity of GDP over the last two years: 4.8% in 2014 (NBS, 2015b) and 5.7% percent year-
on-year in the first three quarters of 2015 (NBS, 2015c), at the same time as GDP growth 
slowed significantly. 
3.2 Energy supply 
At the same time as China’s energy demand growth has been slowing dramatically, China’s 
energy sector transformation has continued apace. Between 2010 and 2014, non-fossil energy 
generation capacity went from 256.7 gigawatts (GW) to 444 GW, an increase of 73% (Song 
et al., 2015). In 2014 alone, China added roughly 22 GW of hydroelectric capacity, more than 
5 GW of nuclear, 21 GW of wind, and 11 GW of solar (mostly photovoltaics) (China 
Electricity Council 2015a; 2015b). By the end of 2014 China’s non-fossil share of total PEC 
was 11.2% (NBS, 2015a).  
The expansion of non-fossil energy sources is being driven by at least three important factors. 
First, it constitutes part of the government’s response to the air pollution crisis by helping to 
reduce reliance on coal-fired power generation (Sheehan et al., 2014). Second, higher 
proportions of indigenous renewable energy mitigate reliance on fossil fuel imports, 
improving energy security (Baghat, 2010). Third, the government has strategically prioritised 
zero-carbon energy generation industries (nuclear and renewables) as innovative sectors in 
which China can move up the global value chain, capture global market share, and secure 
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future domestic industrial growth (Energy Research Institute, 2015; Nahm & Steinfeld, 
2014). These efforts have materialised in strong state support for innovation in, and the 
manufacturing and deployment of, zero-emissions energy sources (Frankfurt School–UNEP 
Centre & BNEF, 2015). 
China is also rapidly expanding its supplies of gas, along with its domestic gas production 
and import capacity, as a key part of its plans to diversify the energy mix and reduce air 
pollution. Gas consumption grew at a compound rate of 14% per year from 2010 to 2014 
(NBS, 2015a). Along with the expansion of other non-coal thermal sources, such as 
bioenergy, the expansion of gas is further eroding the share of coal in China’s energy mix. 
Coal consumption in industry, which accounts for about half of China’s total coal 
consumption, also appears to be falling. The downward pressure on industrial coal use 
resulting from falling steel and cement output (see above section 3.1) is being compounded 
by trends within these industries to substitute away from emissions-intensive production 
processes. For example, industry experts point to a declining proportion of steel being 
produced from blast furnaces (which use coking coal) as these are substituted for methods 
that use recycled scrap steel (which do not use coal), and to similar substitutions toward 
lower-emissions production processes occurring in the cement industry.
5
 
While the expansions of all non-coal energy sources and changing production methods in 
industry are increasingly displacing coal in the energy mix, the government is also taking 
unprecedented steps to regulate coal consumption directly to combat air pollution. In 2013, 
pursuant to its Air Pollution Prevent and Control Action Plan, the government established 
coal caps in nine provinces and cities that together account for 30% of China’s coal 
consumption (Song et al., 2015). 
The combined effects of all of the above measures, in the context of significantly slower PEC 
growth, has been a rapid turnaround in China’s consumption of coal. According to estimates 
by the US Energy Information Administration, in 2014, there was no growth in coal 
consumption when measured on an energy content basis and, when measured in terms of 
physical tonnage, coal consumption fell by 2% (EIA, 2015).
6
 After compound annual growth 
                                                 
5
 Ross Garnaut (personal communication, March 12, 2015).  
6
 The figures cited here take into account the upward revisions to China’s historical coal consumption made by 
China’s statistical agencies following the once-in-five-year economic census, which took place in 2013. The 
census put China’s coal data on a surer footing. China’s National Bureau of Statistics (2015a) reported an 
increase of less than 0.06% in the consumption of coal in Standard Coal Equivalent (SCE) terms in 2014 
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in coal consumption of more than 8% per year in the preceding 13 years, this turnaround is 
remarkable. The rapid change is also reflected in coal production and import data from 2014, 
with production falling 2.5% and imports falling 10.9% (NBS, 2015b). In the first three 
quarters of 2015, coal’s decline deepened, with production falling 4.3% and imports falling 
nearly 30% year-on-year, suggesting consumption fell by around 5% in volumetric terms 
(China Shenhua Energy Company Ltd, 2015).
7
  
While there has been considerable attention paid to anomalies and revisions in China’s recent 
historic coal data up to the end of 2013 (Buckley 2015; Wilson, 2015; Wynn, 2015), the 2014 
and 2015 data are likely to be relatively accurate owing to changes in calculation methods 
made following China’s once-in-five-year economics census in 2013. The 2014–15 data, 
moreover, are consistent with wider market trends, most relevantly in thermal electricity 
generation (where data are more reliable due to metering) and in heavy industry sectors such 
as steel and cement, discussed above (see China Shenhua Energy Company Ltd, 2015, pp. 
14–15; Green and Stern, 2015). Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the 2014–15 coal data 
misrepresent the general picture over this period: flattening and then falling coal 
consumption, production and imports.  
4. The next decade: likely trends and dynamics in China’s energy 
demand, supply and CO2 emissions 
This final section of the article looks forward to the next decade, considering the possible 
evolution of China’s economy and energy system over the course of the 13th and 14th Five 
Year Plans by focusing on key themes and issues affecting the trajectory of China’s CO2 
emissions. Major risks and challenges in relation to each theme are explored, along with 
suggested policy priorities to address these. 
4.1 Energy consumption 
GDP growth: managing structural change for slower but better quality growth 
                                                                                                                                                        
compared with 2013. This increase in SCE consumption at the same time as the fall in physical coal 
consumption reflects an increase in the average quality (hence energy content) of coal burned in China in 2014. 
Preliminary statistics from China’s National Bureau of Statistics had earlier (NBS, 2015b) estimated a 2.9% 
decline in coal consumption in SCE terms in 2014, before changes in average energy content were factored in. 
7
 This figure assumes slower growth in inventories over this period in 2015 compared with 2014. The fall may 
have been lower when measured in terms of energy content, depending on changes in the average quality of coal 
consumed.  
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There is widespread agreement among expert analysts of China’s macroeconomy that the 
long-term structural trend in China is one of slowing economic growth (see, e.g., IMF, 2015; 
Hu, 2015; Johansson et al., 2013; Pritchett & Summers, 2014). That has been the historical 
experience of countries experiencing periods of rapid growth, ‘catch up’ and policy reform. 
China’s growth path, with its past very high savings and investment rates, will likely involve 
a continued shift toward domestic consumption and more productive, higher-value industries, 
including services and clean-technology industries. This will significantly improve living 
standards in China, but likely come with slower GDP growth, since it will be more difficult to 
obtain short-term growth from productivity improvements than from the past strong driver of 
investment in capital stock.  
Successfully transitioning to the new economic model will require domestic policy reforms to 
boost consumption and raise productivity. These include further fiscal reforms to ensure 
governments at relevant levels have sufficient revenue to provide local infrastructure and 
social services to the resident population (e.g. education, healthcare, welfare assistance and 
pensions). They also include reforms in the financial sector, land sector and State-Owned 
Enterprises so as to remove subsidies for resource-intensive and over-capacity industries and 
to improve the productivity of factors of production across the board.  
While these reforms are central to the success of China’s new economic model, they will 
entail transitional costs. Over the past few years and more prominently in 2015, the 
difficulties of managing that transition smoothly have become evident. The financial stimulus 
induced in the context of the global financial crisis (see Section 2) appears to have avoided 
the sharp downturn experienced in many other countries and fuelled GDP growth, but it 
extended the old model of growth and in key respects ran counter to underlying structural 
forces of change. In so doing, it added to underlying vulnerabilities that increased the risk of 
a subsequent sharper fall in the post-stimulus phase. This experience is instructive for those 
who think that China can, or should try to, return to the old model of growth; such a return 
would not be sustainable over the long term. Further attempts at credit-driven stimulus in 
real-estate and heavy industrial sectors now might maintain or boost growth in the short term, 
but would undermine much needed efforts toward policy reform, productivity improvement, 
and sustainable debt management — in turn undermining growth over the longer term (IMF, 
2015).  
13 
 
Yet maintaining aggregate demand and low unemployment is, understandably, a central 
priority of China’s government. Accordingly there is a risk that reform momentum might be 
sacrificed in a drive to maintain high aggregate demand in the short term. It will therefore be 
important in the years ahead that short-term stimulus measures be consistent with the long-
term reform agenda. In this regard, a promising focus for policymakers is ‘green stimulus’ 
and ‘green structural adjustment assistance’: directing government stimulus expenditure 
toward decarbonising the economy — for example through energy efficiency retrofits and 
clean energy infrastructure construction — instead of high-carbon sectors; and retraining 
workers in the declining high-carbon sectors to equip them for jobs in the rapidly growing 
clean economy or other growing economic sectors. This strategy is likely to be particularly 
attractive in light of the Paris Agreement on climate change of December 2015. 
In any case, in light of the long- and short-term factors discussed above, we conclude that 
achieving and sustaining GDP growth of 6% per year on average over the next decade should 
now be seen as a ‘high’ growth scenario, and one that is probably only achievable (in a 
sustained sense) if the government follows through with comprehensive reforms (cf IMF, 
2015, pp. 10–11, 38). That rate of growth would be broadly consistent with projections from 
leading experts, which span a range of 6–7% for the period to 2020 and 3–6% throughout the 
2020s (see, e.g., GCEC 2014; IMF, 2015; Johansson et al., 2013). It would, moreover, be 
consistent with the Chinese government’s own target of 6.5% per year for the 13th Five Year 
Plan (Anonymous, 2015a), since we can reasonably expect the growth rate to slow further in 
the 2020s, in line with the logic and forecasts discussed above. 
Energy intensity of GDP: capitalising on structural change to drive stronger declines in 
energy use 
As highlighted in Section 3.1, the high energy consumption of China’s industry sector means 
that energy consumption growth can slow dramatically as China’s economic structure 
changes in the manner described (Stern, 2011).  
We expect the structural turnaround in heavy industries experienced in 2014–15 to continue 
into the future in response to falling demand associated with China’s excess capacity in 
construction and heavy manufacturing sectors (China Iron and Steel Association [CISA], 
2015; Ernst & Young, 2015), and to the high levels of excess capacity in the steel and cement 
industries themselves (CCICED, 2014). The structural nature of the turnaround in these 
industries is now widely recognised throughout the Chinese government and the industries 
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themselves (Anonymous, 2015b; CISA, 2015). Accordingly, the prospects for declining 
investment, rationalisation and falling production across such sectors in the context of 
China’s new development model now appear strong (on the steel sector see, e.g., Ernst & 
Young, 2015). 
This highlights another important dynamic in China’s new economic model: we are likely to 
see a continuation of the 2014–15 experience in which strong declines in the energy intensity 
of economic growth accompanied slower economic growth (see section 3.1). Accordingly, 
sustaining at least a 4% fall in the energy intensity of GDP over the next decade — a rate of 
improvement commonly assumed by other leading scholars (e.g. Teng and Jotzo, 2014) — 
looks very achievable in the context of China’s new development model.  
There are three main risks to sustaining energy intensity improvements of that order. One risk 
is that certain energy-intensive industries will emerge or expand. Of particular concern here 
are coal conversion industries (discussed below in Section 4.2).  
A second risk is that the pace of intra-industry energy efficiency improvements slows within 
the heavy industries experiencing structural stagnation or decline. An important area of 
policy focus, then, is to ensure strong incentives for continued improvements in energy 
efficiency within those industries. Hove, Enoe and Gordon (2015) argue that there remains 
huge potential for efficiency upgrades in the Jing-Jin-Ji region’s iron and steel sector, and 
that successful government energy conservation programs such as the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
program could be used to drive large additional reductions in CO2 and air pollution through 
efficiency upgrades as the sector declines and restructures. China’s slated national emissions 
trading scheme, which looks set to be structured as a baseline-and-credit scheme focused on 
intra-sectoral efficiency benchmarking, could potentially play a supportive role in this regard. 
A third challenge will be to constrain growth in energy demand from buildings and transport 
as the residential and commercial sectors expand in line with China’s changing economic 
structure, and as household income growth and urbanisation continue. Here, a strong focus on 
compact urban planning — which requires fiscal and land sector reform to address perverse 
incentives for urban sprawl — along with continued strengthening of energy efficiency 
policies (including their enforcement) for vehicles, buildings and appliances will be critical 
(Green and Stern 2014; World Bank & DRC, 2014). 
Overall prospects for PEC: slow growth, with the potential for peak and decline 
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Ultimately, this trend of a slowing economic growth rate and strong declines in energy 
intensity suggests a medium-term future characterised by only modest growth in PEC. Taking 
our (if anything, high) assumption of 6% average GDP growth between 2014–2025 and 
assuming a decline in the energy intensity of GDP of 4% per year over the same period 
would imply growth in Chinese PEC of 1.8% per year to 2025. After average PEC growth of 
more than 8% per year between 2000–2013 this would be a monumental shift. 
Yet even this PEC assumption could be considered conservatively high. The achievement of 
average GDP growth at around 6% over this period is likely to be contingent on successful 
implementation of the government’s market-oriented reform agenda (IMF, 2015). 
Implementation of that agenda would likely accelerate the decline in energy intensity. One 
could therefore plausibly suggest an assumption of lower levels of PEC growth, and 
potentially an absolute fall in PEC alongside strongly rising incomes in the 2020s, under such 
a ‘new normal – high-growth’ scenario. This highlights an important point: one way or 
another (i.e. through higher GDP / lower energy intensity, or lower GDP / higher energy 
intensity), much lower levels of PEC growth relative to the past look set to be a stable feature 
of China’s ‘new normal’. 
4.2 Energy supply 
Despite expected slower PEC growth, we expect China’s expansion of non-fossil energy 
sources to continue apace, alongside oil and gas growth, causing coal’s share in the energy 
mix, and indeed absolute levels of coal consumption, to continue to decline significantly.  
The government’s official target, at the time of writing, is to achieve 15% of PEC from non-
fossil sources by 2020, and 20% by 2030 (up from 11.2% as at the end of 2014: NBS, 2015). 
These targets are likely to be significantly beaten, in part due to expected lower overall PEC 
growth than assumed by the Government when formulating its targets.  
Continued strong expansions of non-fossil energy supply are rendered more likely by the 
three drivers identified in section 3.2: reducing air pollution; improving energy security; and 
promoting growth in strategic clean-technology industries. State support for innovation in, 
and the manufacturing and deployment of, zero-emissions energy sources appears likely to be 
strengthened in the forthcoming 13
th
 Five Year Plan (People’s Bank of China & UNEP, 2015; 
Kuijs, 2015). China is also well placed to gain from further bilateral (e.g. with the US) and 
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multilateral cooperation (e.g. through the G20) in this area, especially following the 
successful Paris climate conference in 2015. 
Moreover, renewable energy capacity expansions continue to be guided by technology-
specific targets (which are not expressed as a share of total PEC), including 200–300 GW of 
wind by 2020 and a solar target that was increased in October 2015 by 50% to 150 GW by 
2020 (Mancheva, 2015). Indeed, such targets have been consistently revised upwards by 
China’s energy planning agencies as costs have plummeted and the industries have grown 
(Jiang, 2014) — forces that are only likely to continue as China and the world move 
increasingly decisively away from fossil fuels. While China’s highly ambitious 2020 target 
for operational nuclear capacity (58 GW) is unlikely to be met, more than 40 GW of nuclear 
power is expected to be operational by this time, and more than 100 GW by 2030 — a build-
out considered ambitious but feasible (see Green and Stern, 2015, pp. 38–39, for discussion). 
While increasing proportions of variable (wind and solar) and non-variable (nuclear) 
electricity generation pose challenges for the stability of the grid, necessary grid 
augmentations and increases in electricity storage capacity are occurring at great scale and 
pace, and this is likely to continue (Garnaut, 2014). 
Large gains in the efficiency of China’s coal-fired power generation fleet have been made 
already, as older and less-efficient plants have been replaced by high-efficiency plants, 
meaning the rate of efficiency improvement may slow in future. Yet there remains 
considerable potential for further efficiency gains, and the central government has increased 
the efficiency standards that existing and new coal plants must meet by 2020, which it 
expects will save around 100 million tonnes of raw coal and reduce CO2 emissions by 180 
million tonnes annually (Anonymous, 2015c; Wei, 2015). 
Beyond the electricity sector, there is great scope for improvements industrial efficiency and 
continued substitution away from coal-intensive production processes in the steel and cement 
industries, discussed in Section 3.2, which will likely continue to put downward pressure on 
coal’s share in the overall energy mix.  
Oil and gas consumption in China are likely to grow significantly over at least the next 
decade, however, there is considerable uncertainty as to the pace of growth and the expected 
peak year for their consumption. Oil consumption growth will be driven by rising demand 
from private and commercial transportation, associated with rising household incomes and 
economic growth. A major determinant will be the size and composition of China’s vehicle 
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stock. However, projections of the future vehicle stock vary enormously as there are so many 
relevant supply and demand side variables; the sector will be the subject of both disruptive 
technological innovation and strong policy intervention over the coming decade and beyond, 
making forecasting difficult (see Gambhir et al., 2015). China has targeted an expansion of its 
share of gas in PEC to 10% by 2020 (State Council, 2014), which looks feasible (see Green 
and Stern 2015, p. 37). 
In sum, while there are many variables at play, it appears likely that the transformation of 
China’s energy sector will continue and indeed strengthen, to the disadvantage of coal. 
However, there are two significant risks that could slow the transformation of China’s energy 
mix over the next decade. In the ‘new normal’ context of low (and potentially even falling) 
electricity demand, continued strong expansions in non-fossil (and gas) generation will 
reduce the market share of existing coal-fired generation. China’s energy supply challenge 
thus shifts from ensuring that all incremental capital stock in the electricity sector is zero-
/low-carbon to also reducing, retiring or refurbishing existing, high-carbon stock. This will 
complicate the political economy of electricity decarbonisation. The slower electricity 
demand growth and high non-coal capacity expansions of 2014–15 illustrate this challenging 
new dynamic. As coal-fired generation output fell (see Section 3.2) while coal-fired power 
capacity expanded, the utilisation of the coal-fired power fleet has plummeted to less than 
50% (National Energy Administration, 2015). The falling utilisation of coal plants has 
inflamed disputes among generators and grid operators about which sources should be given 
priority to dispatch electricity (and therefore receive payments for electricity supplied). Coal-
fired power generators were often given priority over wind and solar generators, leading to 
high rates of wind and solar ‘curtailment’ and more coal being consumed than needed to be 
(Anonymous, 2014). 
These disputes over dispatch priority will likely intensify in future, due not only to lower 
energy demand and increased non-fossil supply, but also to the expansion of China’s coal-
fired generation capacity, which has continued — in fact, it has accelerated — in 2014–15 
despite already enormous amounts of excess capacity. The main causal factor behind the 
most recent expansions appears to be the devolution of authority over environmental 
approvals from the centre to provincial governments, many of which have welcomed the 
opportunity for short-term economic growth from the construction of new plants with little 
regard for the long-term productivity of the investment (Myllyvirta, Shen & Lammi, 2015). 
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Amid low coal prices and growing numbers of new coal plants expecting returns on 
investment, there is a risk of a resurgence in coal-fired power generation and a slowdown in 
non-fossil expansion. 
A second risk is the expansion of coal conversion industries — which produce, for example, 
synthetic natural gas or chemicals from coal using highly energy- and emissions-intensive 
processes. The central government is unlikely to approve a large expansion of coal 
conversion industries, especially the coal-to gas-industry, in light of China’s climate change 
commitments, the dubious economic case for their expansion and the extremely high impacts 
on local water consumption and air pollution (Ding et al. 2013; Ottery, 2014; Sheehan et al., 
2014; Yang & Jackson, 2013). Nonetheless, there is a risk that enterprises and local 
governments might expand these industries contrary to central government policy.  
These risks suggest the need for various policy responses. First, a range of measures would 
help to rein in the expansion of new coal infrastructure in electricity and industry, including a 
ban or at least tight restrictions on new coal-fired power stations and coal conversion 
projects, (re-)centralised control over approvals and financing, and stringent caps on overall 
coal consumption (see also comments by Zhou Dadi, quoted in Zhao, 2015). Such moves 
would also free up capital in the energy sector that could be reallocated to expanding non-
fossil energy deployment. 
A second priority is to reform the operation of the electricity sector to ensure that the lowest-
carbon and most efficient electricity generation sources are given priority to dispatch 
electricity into the grid — so-called ‘green dispatch’. This would help to ensure non-fossil 
generation sources are prioritised over fossil generation, and that gas and more efficient coal-
fired generators are prioritised over less efficient coal generators. 
Third is to increase effective carbon prices on fossil fuel energy sources, especially coal. 
Even while generators cannot pass through carbon price costs onto consumers, effective 
carbon pricing would alter the economics on the supply-side in ways that would disadvantage 
high-carbon generators and support green dispatch. A rising coal tax would be a highly 
efficient and administratively effective measure, well-suited to China’s institutional context 
(Green and Stern, 2014; 2015), though a well-designed and implemented emissions trading 
scheme operating in the electricity sector could in theory achieve similar results (Baron et al., 
2012).  
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Promisingly, the Government has signalled at the highest levels its intention to move strongly 
in each of these policy directions in the September 2015 U.S.–China Joint Presidential 
Statement on Climate Change. As ever in China, local implementation will be critical, which 
means incentives for local governments and SOEs in the fossil fuel and electricity sector to 
cooperate may be necessary. A financial strategy for managing stranded coal assets and a 
labour market strategy for supporting and retraining workers for a transition to new growth 
industries would complement the other measures suggested above. 
4.3 Implications for China’s CO2 emissions trajectory and peaking 
Combining the above analysis, we can readily see how the trajectory of China’s CO2 
emissions over the next decade is likely to be radically different from that during 2000–2013. 
It is quite possible that emissions will fall modestly from now on, implying that 2014 was the 
peak. If emissions do grow above 2014 levels — if, say, a number of the risks identified 
earlier manifest — that growth trajectory is likely to be relatively flat, and a peak would still 
be highly likely by 2025. More likely it will occur at some point between 2014 and 2025, 
depending on how the above factors play out. 
This potential can be illustrated via a simple scenario that uses a Kaya decomposition, similar 
to Teng and Jotzo (2014), as per Table 1, below. We adopt the same approach and historical 
values/assumptions as those authors, albeit with some updated forward-looking assumptions 
broadly in line with the likely trends we identify in this article: GDP growth from 2014–2020 
is assumed to correspond roughly to the official target of 6.5% per year on average, slowing 
to 5.5% per year on average over the subsequent five years; energy intensity is assumed to 
decline at 4% per year over the decade; CO2 intensity of energy is assumed to decline at 1% 
per year over the next five years, ramping to 1.5% per year in the 2020s. The result is a peak 
in CO2 emissions between 2020 and 2025. 
Table 1: Illustrative peak CO2 scenario under ‘new normal’ conditions 
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Under this scenario, China’s GDP would double between 2010 and 2020 — consistent with 
the Government’s goal for China to be a ‘moderately well-off society’ by 2020 (Anonymous, 
2015a) — and China’s pledged commitments to peak CO2 and reduce the CO2 intensity of 
GDP by 60–65% by 2030 (People’s Republic of China, 2015) would be achieved more than 
five years early. 
4. Conclusion 
This article has provided a synthetic overview of trends and dynamics in China’s economic 
development, energy demand and energy supply during the heavy industry-based growth 
period of 2000–13 and the beginning of the ‘new normal’ period 2014–15. It has argued that 
China is undergoing large-scale, rapid, and multidimensional changes in economic structure, 
with major implications for energy demand, at the same time as the energy supply is 
diversifying. Based on our analysis of likely future trends, we concluded that China’s CO2 
emissions from energy — if they grow at all — are likely to grow much slower than under 
the old economic model and are likely to peak at some point in the decade before 2025. 
Our analysis could usefully be applied and extended in future research in at least two ways. 
First, our findings reinforce the call by Grubb et al. (2015) for a new generation of models 
that better represent the range of possible outcomes from slowing GDP growth and structural 
economic change away from heavy industry. When combined with recent improvements in 
understanding baseline historical data (e.g. Liu et al., 2015), our analysis of recent data and 
likely trends could help inform new models and modeling assumptions that yield a much 
more realistic range of China’s future emissions scenarios than at present. Second, whereas 
this article focused on energy CO2 emissions, the analysis of structural change in China’s 
economy could usefully inform analysis and projections of China’s non-energy CO2 
Annual 
growth (%)
Index (2005 
= 1) at 2013
Annual 
growth (%)
Index 
(2005 = 1) 
at 2020
Annual 
growth 
(%)
Index 
(2005 = 1) 
at 2025
Annual 
growth 
(%)
Index 
(2005 = 1) 
at 2030
GDP 10.1 2.16 6.5 3.355412 5.5 4.385389 4.5 5.464992
Energy/GDP -3.8 0.73 -4 0.551187 -4 0.449423 -4 0.366447
CO2/energy -0.5 0.96 -1 0.895429 -1.5 0.830256 -1.5 0.769827
CO2/GDP -4.3 0.70 -4.9% 0.493549 -5.4% 0.373136 -5.4% 0.282101
Energy 6.0 1.58 2.2% 1.85 1.3% 1.97 0.3% 2.00
CO2 5.4 1.52 1.2% 1.66 -0.2% 1.64 -1.2% 1.54
* hypothetical - included to illustrate peak (not discussed in text)
2005-2013 (actual) 2014-2020 2021-2025 2026-2030*
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emissions and non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Developments in both of these directions would, in 
turn, help improve understanding of the size of, and dynamics affecting, the remaining global 
carbon budget. 
Our analysis and conclusions have a number of important implications for policy. First, they 
suggest that China’s international commitment to peak emissions ‘around 2030’ should be 
seen as a highly conservative upper limit from a government that prefers to under-promise 
and over-deliver. Better global understanding of the extent and pace of change occurring in 
China should spur a reassessment of likely future global emissions, trends in the relative 
prices of commodities and technologies affected by structural change in China, and market 
opportunities for low-/zero-carbon technologies and services. The more governments and 
businesses understand the shift in China, the more they should see risks in the high-carbon 
economy and opportunities in the low-/zero-carbon economy, and should adjust their 
investments, innovation priorities, and institutional arrangements accordingly. 
This also suggests the value of including transparent economic information in the Nationally 
Determined Contributions communicated by countries to the UNFCCC pursuant to the Paris 
Agreement negotiated in December 2015. In particular, countries that have adopted emissions 
intensity targets (including China) should clarify the assumptions on growth and structural 
change that underpin those targets. 
Second, this article underscores the importance of macroeconomic analysis for emissions 
projections. Structural economic change has been shown to be a major determinant of 
China’s emissions over the last 15 years — under the old model of growth, it was a driver of 
emissions growth; under the new model, it is and will continue to be a driver of emissions 
reductions. Accordingly, macroeconomic analysis agencies, both within China and 
internationally, have an important role to play in analysing factors affecting future emissions 
trajectories. The onus is on both the traditional climate community (not least those who 
model emissions scenarios) and the macroeconomic community to better engage one another 
in the course of undertaking such analysis and forecasting. 
The third policy implication of our analysis, following on from the second, is that 
macroeconomic policy and planning organisations, both domestically and internationally, 
have a key role to play in shaping climate policy to achieve and accelerate decarbonisation. 
While policies targeting greenhouse gas emissions explicitly (e.g. carbon pricing) and energy 
consumption explicitly (e.g. energy conservation programs) are clearly essential, our analysis 
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suggests that sound macroeconomic policy and planning are also highly important to 
decarbonisation. This is especially the case in China and other rapidly developing economies, 
given the greater range of growth and development pathways open to them in the years and 
decades ahead compared with developed countries. Those growth pathways will be highly 
influenced by fiscal, financial, trade and labour market policies. It will therefore be important 
for international economic institutions such as the G20 to be highly engaged with processes 
of decarbonisation, especially in regard to infrastructure financing. China is ideally placed to 
advance this agenda as Chair of the G20 in 2016, and given its central involvement in the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund. 
Finally, the pace and scale of change in China, and the many uncertainties attending 
projections of its future emissions, reinforce the virtue of a dynamic approach to international 
climate cooperation, as envisaged under the Paris Agreement, whereby countries’ targets, 
plans and policies are regularly updated in light of new information, opportunities and risks. 
In this way, countries will (individually and collectively) be better equipped to capitalise on 
the extraordinary opportunities, and respond to emerging risks, associated with the energy-
industrial revolution that is underway, the completion of which is essential to avoiding 
catastrophic climate change. 
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